As the year-end campaign for the 2026 Local Elections (9-in-1 Elections) enters full swing, Tsai Tzung-Shi, Chief Prosecutor of the Taiwan Chiayi District Prosecutors Office (CDPO), personally led a delegation on the morning of June 18, 2026. Accompanied by Head Prosecutors Chen Jing-hui and Chiang Zhi-ren, as well as Prosecutors Chiu Chao-chih, Jan Chiao-wei, Huang Tian-yi, and Hsiao Shih-yung, Chief Prosecutor Tsai visited the Minxiong Division of the Chiayi County Police Bureau to chair a divisional symposium on election interference investigations, demonstrating a steadfast commitment to strict law enforcement and a rigorous crackdown on bribery.

In addition to prosecutorial authorities, the symposium was attended by key agency heads and representatives, including:

• Ku Jui-lin, Commissioner of the Chiayi County Police Bureau

• Tseng Kuan-ying, Chief of the Minxiong Police Division

• Wu Zhen-yi, Deputy Director of the Chiayi County Station, Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Justice

• Luo Jin-ding, Captain of the Chiayi Specialized Operation Brigade, National Immigration Agency

• Representatives from the Chiayi County Government Ethics Department and the Government Ethics Offices of various townships under the Minxiong Division's jurisdiction.

Intelligence indicates that with political party nominations finalized and the incumbent county magistrate reaching the term limit, townships such as Minxiong, Dalin, Xingang, and Xikou are witnessing fierce grassroots jockeying due to the intersection of political parties and local factions, combined with changes in the number of available seats. Among these, the mayoral and township chief elections present intense two-way or multi-way races, with Minxiong Township serving as the core bellwether. In the 2nd Electoral District for County Councilors (Minxiong, Xingang), the number of seats has increased to 8, leading to unprecedented competition. Conversely, the 3rd Electoral District (Dalin, Xikou, Meishan) has seen its seats reduced from 5 to 4, putting immense re-election pressure on incumbents. At the grassroots level, village chief elections face a generational transition; notably, "Beidou Village" in Minxiong Township has been officially split to create the new "Xinshan Village" due to population growth, introducing entirely new dynamics to the local political landscape.

Head Prosecutors Chen Jing-hui and Chiang Zhi-ren highlighted key operational priorities for these "bribery hotspots," instructing all agencies to deploy informants extensively and guard against diverse forms of election bribery:

1. Rigorous Crackdown on Traditional Cash Vote-Buying: Prevent candidates’ local campaign managers (樁腳) from deploying "all-in-one" or "bundled" joint vote-buying schemes.

2. Prevention of Bribery Disguised as Endowments or Alternative Incentives: Strictly investigate the gifting of daily necessities with substantial economic value, the distribution of "walking money" (stipends) under false pretenses, or the covert hosting of free or significantly underpriced tours and banquets through temples or senior citizens' associations.

3. Comprehensive Tracking of "Ghost Populations" (Fictitious Households): Conduct thorough audits against abnormal household registrations and multiple-occupant households in areas with grassroots elections to detect fraudulent relocations.

Chief Prosecutor Tsai specifically noted that the Minxiong jurisdiction encompasses agricultural zones, emerging university towns, and industrial parks, where local factions and party politics are intertwined. Consequently, equal emphasis must be placed on public awareness and law enforcement. The CDPO's "Election Interference Investigation Task Force" has been fully activated to counter four core challenges:

1. Cracking Down on Election Bribery and Violence: Extensively deploy informants and scrutinize the cash flows of candidates.

2. Severing Illegal Gambling Pools: Implement the highest standard of confidentiality for informant identities.

3. Thwarting AI Deepfake Disinformation: Establish real-time reporting and digital verification mechanisms to swiftly investigate and handle generative AI-produced smear videos and audio clips.

4. Blocking External Forces from Interfering in Elections: Closely monitor modern illicit benefit transfers via electronic payments and virtual currencies, while cracking down on underground remittances and abnormal, subsidized trips to Mainland China intended to support specific candidates.

During the meeting, regulations regarding rewards for reporting election interference were also highlighted. Citizens who discover suspicious leads are urged to call the toll-free reporting hotline at 0800-024099 (press 4). The CDPO will maintain the strictest confidentiality and issue substantial rewards: up to NT$20 million for reporting external force interference, up to NT$10 million for vote-buying, and up to NT$5 million for election gambling pools, working together to safeguard a fair and competitive electoral order.